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1I owe thanks to Prof. William Desmond, Dr. Haydn Gurmin, and Dr.
Marianne Sawicki for many helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
2Recent years, however, have seen a growing number of publications on Stein’s
philosophy. They have also seen the near completion of the superb critical edition
of her works (Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe [ESGA]), as well as translations into several
languages: English (ICS Publications, Washington, D.C.), Italian, Spanish, Polish,
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WHY DO WE NEED THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDITH STEIN?
• Mette Lebech •
“The science of the Cross involves the subject 
to the point of its own annihilation and abandonment
into the meaning of being. The paradox is that this
abandonment represents a foundation for knowledge.”
It is a complex issue, need. How does one know what one needs?
When we justify why we act and want and write the way we do, we
often do so with reference to a need for something. That there is a
legitimate recognized need for something makes a convincing
argument. “Why do we need the philosophy of Edith Stein?” is a
question asking for reasons as to why we should read Stein’s
philosophy and spend time to come to know her work. It asks for
the motives of her thought, for what is at stake in her philosophy.1
Stein is known primarily as a martyr and saint.2 That Stein’s
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Slovakian, and French. For secondary literature in English, see John Haydn Gurmin
and Liz Meade’s “List of Secondary Philosophical Sources in English” available on
the website of the International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein
(IASPES) (www.edithsteincircle.com); also see there Rosalia Caruso’s bibliography
of works in Italian. Bibliographies of works in German, Polish and French are
being prepared. The unity of Stein’s philosophical purpose, the depth and honesty
of her engagement with both contemporary and traditional thought, as well as her
single-minded pursuit of meaning wherever it is found, deserve to be honored.
Now that the Church has recognized Stein as a saint and a patroness of Europe, it
might consider bestowing on her the title of Doctor of the Church. Stein does fit
the criteria: she possesses insignis vitae sanctitas; she teaches, as I hope to show in the
following, an eminens doctrina; only the ecclesiae declaratio would seem then to be
lacking. Although no martyr has been declared doctor, perhaps because martyrs are
ipso facto teachers of the Christian faith, giving the title to Stein would recognize her
outstanding contribution to contemporary philosophy and its development, and
perhaps help the world appreciate this contribution. Her title surely would be
doctoressa scientiae crucis. 
saintliness has obscured her philosophy is partly due to the fact that
saintliness of life perhaps is more important than the products of
intellectual activity, but it is probably also due to the difficulty of
her works and to the fact that she is a woman. Why would she
need to write something so demanding, and why should we need
to put in such effort to read it? Why would it not be enough for
her to be a lovely woman and a saint? Why do we need her
philosophy as well?
Need 
We seem to know about need from three sources: 
1. From our inner experience, from sensations we have
learned to identify as warning signs of mental or physical breakdown,
from suffering, related as it is to desire and inclination without being
exactly identical to these.
2. We know of need from the experience of others who we
see suffer, threaten to break down, or become maimed, spiritually,
psychologically, or physiologically.
3. And we know of need from what it is, its essence, in terms
of which we know what pertains to it as such. It is not exactly pain
or desire, for example, but it seems to involve both in some way. It
seems to signify the threat of destruction of an organism, a mind, or
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3On the Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Herbstrith (Washington D.C.: ICS
Publications, 1986). Zum Problem der Einfühlung, ESGA 5, Herder, 2008. An earlier
(incomplete) Herder edition exists (the “Yellow Edition”), Edith Steins Werke
(ESW), which has been replaced by the critical ESGA. As it happens On the
Problem of Empathy (1916), Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), and
An Investigation Concerning the State (1925) were not available in the old edition.
The two latter were published by Niemeyer in 1970. Introduction to Philosophy
(1918–20) was available only in a confused state. Thus Stein’s four earliest works,
written before her baptism, were relatively unavailable in German until very
recently. English translations of many of Stein’s works exist in the Collected Works
of Edith Stein (CWES), published by ICS Publications in Washington, who decided
recently to start translating from the new critical edition, though some follow-up
work on the previously published volumes remains. 
a complex whole, felt from the inside as the craving of the unity
threatened. Or it signifies simply that which a whole requires in
order to be whole, the imperfection of a being the essence of which
is imperfectly instantiated. Then need is understood in dependence
on our understanding of the whole or the essence imperfectly
instantiated.
From these sources we build an understanding of being in
need, and only in terms of these can we evaluate what we, what
other people, what tradition and public opinion hold about need,
and about what we need, about what the human being needs. The
proper identification of need is thus a key question for philosophical
anthropology. Even more importantly it is a key question for
ontology, as a proper evaluation of the fullness of being is available
only when we can also discern lack.
Stein’s own need to think was a need to face reality in all its
dimensions, especially the personal and social ones. From her
doctoral thesis On the Problem of Empathy3 onwards, she systematically
explored the intersubjective constitution of the world and its
negotiation of being, without which this constitution comes to
nothing: we all relate to the world in terms of what it is. Stein’s need
to clarify her thinking in the midst of this negotiation in dialogue
with others made her write it down. 
This need had specific dimensions, which constituted Stein
in all her completeness as a person. In commenting on a draft of
this article Marianne Sawicki aptly characterized these as follows:
It seems to me that her [Stein’s] evolving needs went from broad
and grand, to narrow and deep:
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4It is customary to regard the early period as ending with Stein’s baptism.
However, if we take the next period as characterized by the need to understand the
forces that frustrated her need to participate, it would be natural to include her
essay on the state in her second period (published in 1925, but written, at least in
part, before her baptism in 1922), and see baptism as a step to counterbalance the
frustration. Likewise, the middle period can be seen to end with her entering the
Carmel in Cologne, but her twin works on the human person (Structure of the
Human Person and What is the Human Being?) were written while she was still in
[a] to found the sciences and the humanities on a single unified
insight
[b] to have a career [...] 
[c] to repair the German state 
[d] to develop a theory of women’s education 
[e] to find meaning in the dearth of meaning around her 
[f] to identify the principle of the unity of humanity 
[g] to find a home and be at home there
The inner logic of these needs permits us to reduce them to three:
1. to unfold and contribute (to phenomenology and
philosophy theoretically and practically [a–b]);
2. to understand why this need was frustrated (why the
German state veered toward totalitarianism, why women were
discriminated against for philosophical careers, and why people
desiring to counteract these were not effective [c–e]);
3. to find a way to unfold and contribute despite failure,
rejection, and persecution (to find salvation through forgiveness and
solidarity with all and to be at home through faith in the redemption
achieved by Christ [f–g]).
Stein’s philosophical development falls in fact into three
periods, which may each be seen as determined by these progres-
sively developing needs. The early period is characterized by a
critical development of phenomenology to analyze socially
constructed phenomena. It represents Stein’s initial contribution
to phenomenology. The middle period concentrates on anthropol-
ogy and the translation of Christian thought and tradition into the
philosophical idiom of phenomenology. It is characterized by new
starts and a reassessment of the community to which she wanted
to contribute. The later period is determined by a commitment to
Christian philosophy and mysticism. Here Stein’s home in Carmel
allowed her to rely on Christian doctrine in her thinking.4 
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Münster, and these explain her commitment to Christian philosophy. Thus, while
baptism and the entry into Carmel mark Stein’s development, they are also
prepared by it and by the evolving needs that carve out and explain this
development. Both events provide new direction as Stein chooses a new set of
conditions to which to adapt. For an updated version of Marianne Sawicki’s
chronology of Stein’s works, please consult the IASPES website.
5See Einführung in die Philosophie, ESGA 8, pp. 69–100 (I, c, 5–17) and our
discussion of this work in what follows.
6The phenomenological investigation of motivation is not exclusive to Stein.
Alexander Pfänder wrote a phenomenology of willing and motivation
(Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation and Other Phenomenologica, trans. and ed.
Herbert Spiegelberg, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy, 1967 (translated from Phenomenologie des Wollens: Eine
psychologische Analyse, 1900), which extensively influenced Paul Ricoeur’s
Philosophie de la volonté I–II. That the notion is so important for Stein shows the
influence the Munich phenomenology had on her. The idea of motivation
remained relatively foreign to Husserl, who associated it with the psychologism he
suspected in the Munich tradition. 
By following the development of her philosophy we shall
trace the inner contours of her life, the path she had to follow. As
her philosophy engages with phenomenology, fundamental psychol-
ogy, social philosophy, epistemology, anthropology, ontology, and
mysticism, it reflects the mindscapes she went through to get to the
things themselves. 
Stein’s approach to philosophy
It is in fact the attempt to get to the things themselves that
characterizes her approach in its entirety. Stein was a phenomenol-
ogist: she saw the starting point for philosophical inquiry in experi-
ence, and she regarded this starting point as indispensable. Her
emphasis on empathy allows us to comprehend how our experience
influences that of others, how in turn it itself is influenced by their
experience, and how intersubjectivity, as a consequence, is struc-
tured and “socially constructs” the world in which we live. Under-
standing the structure of intersubjectivity as it builds our social world
and informs our perceptions of the natural world sets us free to look
at our own judging about what and how things are.5 It allows us to
see our own motivations6 and those of others, see how they occasion
our communities and institutions and to look back at the needs and
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7“What lovely weather it is today!”; “It is dinner time!”; “That’ll be seven euro
fifty.” The very form of judgment involves the “is” or can be translated into a
statement that does. This argument is made by Hedwig Conrad-Martius: Das Sein
(Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1957). This work relies on unpublished material from the
thirties, and thus probably reflects Conrad-Martius’ thought as Stein was exposed
to it. The two were friends, Conrad-Martius became Stein’s godmother, and they
remained in philosophical exchange throughout Stein’s life. Joachim Feldes has
done much to unearth the Bergzabern Circle of phenomenologists, to which they
both belonged in the twenties. See, for example, his contribution to the
proceedings of the IASPES International Conference Intersubjectivity, Humanity,
Being. Edith Stein’s Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy, ed. Haydn Gurmin and
Mette Lebech (Traugot-Bautz, libri nigri, forthcoming).
nature of the human being as the explanation of these motivations
and of the socially constructed world. As there is no erasing of one’s
own perspective, there is no practical possibility of not judging about
existence in the most ordinary of ways.7 This practical impossibility
makes up the necessity of ontic and eidetic analyses, i.e. analyses of
what things are or appear to be and of the essence of those things. At
the heart of intersubjective, personal experience thus lies being;
controversial or shared, meaningful and valuable; turning toward it
implies an intelligent openness beyond prejudice toward that which
appears. Stein grounded her thinking in personal life and also tested
it there. She understood this personal experience to be shareable
insofar as it can be understood. She encouraged her readers to
examine this same experience (the personal and the shared) to test
the plausibility of what she says, with attention to experience
disciplined by the adoption of the phenomenological attitude. 
Sometimes Stein’s spirit of collaboration is mistaken for lack
of originality. To Stein, learning is part of the human condition, and
it obliges us to attempt to penetrate what others say in order to get
to “the things themselves.” Thus she thinks with and with the help of
other thinkers, in a manner that renders her style of criticism and her
hermeneutic practices recognizable. These practices, however, must
not be taken for dependency on others’ thought, as Stein mostly
criticizes by improving, i.e., by providing an interpretation of the
thinking at hand that lends itself to understand better the subject
under investigation (as distinct from obscuring it). This means that
she sometimes prolongs the thinking according to its own principles
over and above what it achieved by itself, so that her criticism is
literally constructive. Her corrective completions of Husserl, Scheler,
Aquinas, Aristotle, Conrad-Martius, Pseudo-Dionysius, and John of
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8Stein characterizes, for example, her relationship to Husserl’s thought in
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities in the following manner: “A few words
remain to be said to clarify the relation of my investigations to the work of
Edmund Husserl. I’ve been helping Professor Husserl for nearly two years with the
preparation of large publications. During this time, all his manuscripts from the last
ten years have been at my disposal (among them those that have to do with the
topic of psychology and the humanities as well). It goes without saying that
important influences on my own work came out of the stimulation that I was
receiving in this way and in many conversations. Today I myself no longer am able
to keep track of the extent to which this has been the case. It just wasn’t possible
for me to give references through citation, because the material in question is
unpublished [she is speaking in particular of Ideas II and III] and also because very
often I was not sure whether I would have to regard something as my own
research result or as an internal appropriation of transferred thought motifs.”
(Foreword). Stein thus acknowledges her philosophical kinship, but she also states
that the material has become so familiar to her that she thinks out of it in her own
manner. In fact, she takes Husserl’s thought further.
9Endliches und ewiges Sein, ESGA 11/12, IV, §3, pp. 139–93.
10Wege der Gotteserkenntnis. Die symbolische Theologie des Areopagiten und ihre
sachlichen Voraussetzungen, in Wege der Gotteserkenntnis, ESGA 17, pp. 22–77; CWES
VIII (Knowledge and Faith), V, pp. 83–188.
11Marianne Sawicki has called this technique “chiselling” and “ventriloquism”
(Body Text and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of
Edith Stein [Kluwer, 1996], ch. 4). Sawicki thus identifies in negative terms the
method we here identify as “literally constructive.” Whether one values the
method positively or negatively, Stein’s interpretations are to be found as part of
a systematic whole, so that they become fully comprehensible only when seen as
part of her own project as a systematic philosopher. Stein says the following about
the method she as a philosopher sees herself obliged to follow: “The philosopher
must not only attempt to see and show the fact that someone went about it in such
and such a way; his insight must not only extend to the connections between the
other’s grounds [Grund] and consequences. The philosopher must also grasp why his
predecessor went about it like this. He must get down to the grounds themselves
and grasp them. And this means that the grounds must grip him and best him in the
the Cross all exemplify this style. The criticism is always voiced, but
because of its polite understatement and often highly complex
nature, readers might not immediately identify it as critique at all.8
Correcting Aristotle’s concept of substance for its dependence on a
flawed concept of matter, however,9 or writing an entire missing
treatise of Pseudo-Dionysius on symbolic theology to give balance
to his work as it has been received in the Christian tradition,10
nevertheless embodies substantial critiques of formative strands in
European thought.11 
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sense that he decides to accept them and retraces within himself the path the other
followed from grounds to conclusions, perhaps even going beyond him. Or else
he must best the grounds; I mean, he must decide to get free of them and take
another path” (Potency and Act [CWES], Foreword, pp. 2–3. ESGA 10, p. 4). In
the opposite direction it also means that the interpretation present in her work
for others (editions and translations, ghost-writings and corrections) often forms
an indispensable part of her own thought process, and hence is explanatory of
her systematic directions. The commented translations and editions (Reinach’s
Gesammelte Werke, Husserl’s Ideas II and III, Aquinas’ De Veritate and the Works
of Pseudo-Dionysius) and also the commented anthology of dogmatic
declarations Was ist der Mensch? often contain the keys to major shifts in her own
thinking. That such shifts take place when engaged with the thought of others
is, arguably, a common experience. It means, however, that what is presented
as editions and translations must be read as one reads commentaries, as this is
what they are. The idea that Stein abandoned phenomenology for Thomism
underestimates the scope of the Auseinandersetzung between the two traditions
carried out in The Structure of the Human Being, Potency and Act, and in Finite and
Eternal Being. 
12In fact, if one begins with the later, distinctly Christian, work one can easily
miss out on both its profundity and its modernity. This is not to say that the
early work is more important than the later, or that it stands in contrast with it.
But it is difficult to understand the later work without understanding it as
reflecting Stein’s lifelong involvement with phenomenology, or to understand
the depth of Stein’s early work unless one sees it as reflecting her relentless quest
for the meaning of being. The unity of Stein’s work is not only testified to by
recurrent themes (the human being, education, community, and meaning) but
also by the fact that Stein does not retract anything said in the earlier works, but
rather refers to them in her later work. In Potency and Act, for example, she refers
to Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities to explain the concept of Lebenskraft
(ESGA, 10 p. 222). Stein also never repeats herself, but presupposes earlier
work, to the point of never concluding by reiterating the results. Many other
narratives describing the inner progression of her thought have informed mine
(in particular those of Herbstrith, Baseheart, Gerl-Falkovitz, Sawicki, Borden,
and MacIntyre).
13We include in this period Stein’s four major works in phenomenology: On the
Problem of Empathy (ESGA 5), Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (ESGA 6),
Introduction to Philosophy (ESGA 8), and An Investigation concerning the State (ESGA
7). The translation (undertaken with Hedwig Conrad-Martius) of Alexandre
In what follows we shall treat of the early period more in
depth in order to bring out the complexity of the foundation for
Stein’s later philosophy.12
I. Early writings13
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Koyré’s Descartes und die Scholastik (ESGA 25) also pertains to this period, as does
Stein’s edition of Reinach’s Gesammelte Schriften. 
14She states as much herself in the autobiography Life in a Jewish Family, CWES
1, V, 5, p. 217ff: Aus dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie, ESGA 1, p. 169ff.
15Marianne Sawicki’s Body Text and Science has ventured a version of events and
has studied the manuscripts thoroughly in chapter 2 with a view to discern Stein’s
role in the edition of Ideas II. Sawicki relies for her analysis on the thesis that Stein’s
additions contain the understanding that the body lies before constitution,
something the present author cannot consider warranted by Stein’s other writings.
(See my “Stein’s Phenomenology of the Body. Between Description of Experience
and Social Construction,” Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, ed. Fiacra Long
[2008]: 61–70). Stein’s constitutional analysis of the body in Chapter III of On the
Problem of Empathy shows precisely how the body is constituted from experience.
That our constitution of the body is the most adequate identification of our
experience is hard to deny, and in this sense one can of course claim that the body
is “before” experience—in the same sense, in this case then, as everything else is:
the body could not have among constituted things a status different from theirs,
except as embodying an I of which I know by the means of empathy. Empathy and
constitution are not on the same level, however: empathy is an act, constitution the
function of the I. Constitution happens through acts, not before or after them. As
Stein is keen to adhere to the method of transcendental phenomenology and
explains her method in terms of it in both On the Problem of Empathy (ESGA 5, pp.
11–14 [1–4]; II, §1) and Einführung in die Philosophie (ESGA 8, Einleitung), she
would not want to regard the body as prior to constitution, even when she writes
for Husserl, as she also would not understand him to want to write that (taking the
body as prior to constitution would to both amount to dogmatism). To identify the
sections written by Stein as characterized by this thesis is therefore to my mind
questionable. That Stein did attempt to bring Husserl’s fragments into cohesion,
and that she did substantially edit precisely to avoid a contradiction between
It is well known that Stein left Breslau for Göttingen to study
with Edmund Husserl and wrote her doctoral dissertation On the
Problem of Empathy under his supervision.14 The period of their
relationship that followed her viva in 1916 is not as easily known.
The philosophical story is complicated by the interconnectedness of
Husserl’s Ideas II and III, edited by Stein, and her own Philosophy of
Psychology and the Humanities, which she wrote in order to comple-
ment Ideas II and III. This interconnection has still not been
sufficiently explored. Nor have the consequences of this interaction
been drawn out fully in phenomenological research into the issues
debated in those works: the foundation of intersubjectivity, the role
of the body, the constitution of the social world, and the foundation
of psychology and the human sciences.15 Stein ends her autobiogra-
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considering on the one hand the body as pre-given to constitution and therefore
unfailingly embodying foreign subjectivity, and on the other the perspective of the
other accessed by the means of empathy as part of the constitution of the body of
the other, cannot be denied. What that shows, however, is just that the text was
not thought through sufficiently. It was this that frustrated Stein, because it revealed
that the act of empathy also was not sufficiently thought through in its
consequences by Husserl. Insofar as Sawicki regards empathy as a function, and not
as an act, however, she goes directly against Stein’s formulation of Chapter II
(which is entitled The Essence of the Act of Empathy), where she explicitly compares
empathy to other acts in order to circumscribe its essence. Her intent seems to be
to safeguard the independence and irreducible nature of the spiritual, which is
infelt. This independence is, as far as I can see, manifest in the objectivity of the
values motivating experience. And motivation is not an act, but “the connection
acts get into with one another: (…) an emerging of one out of the other, a self-
fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the basis of the other, for the sake of the
other” (Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, I, III, §1, p. 39). It is thus closer
to being on the same level as constitution than empathy is. Motivation is not a, or
the, function of the I, as constitution is, but rather seems to affect the constitution
in an observable manner (ibid).
16Life in a Jewish Family, CWES, p. 414; ESGA 1, p. 343.
17Ibid., p. 269. ESGA 1, pp. 218–9.
phy with the defence of her doctoral thesis.16 But we must attempt
a version of the events that followed to understand where she went
from there.
When Stein accepted the position as Husserl’s assistant, she
burned with enthusiasm for the project that he stood for: the
founding of Phenomenology as a universal science. He envisaged
that providing phenomenological analyses of the formal objects of
the sciences would allow for investigations into every field of
knowledge, which would thus become securely based and as a
consequence pseudo-science could be discarded. Stein understood
this to be of indisputable value because it would help us unify our
efforts toward knowing and understanding reality as a whole and
thus aid humanity’s progress. Insofar as Husserl’s project was
identical with this goal, she could fulfill her own ambition by
helping him publish his contributions toward its realization. 
Stein had already been convinced, however, that the missing
link between subjectivity and intersubjectivity (which was indispens-
able for understanding how one accedes to the objectivity required
by scientific understanding) had not been sufficiently investigated by
Husserl.17 This was the reason she had written her doctoral disserta-
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18“All these data of foreign experience point back to the basic nature of acts in
which foreign experience is comprehended. We now want to designate these as
acts of empathy, regardless of all historical traditions attached to the word. To grasp
and describe these acts in the greatest essential generality will be our first
undertaking” (On the Problem of Empathy II, §1, p. 6 [CWES]; ESGA 5, pp. 13–14).
19On the Problem of Empathy, Chapter IV. The emphasis on motivation as the
function specific to the person, and the spiritual content of the empathized is
specific to Stein. Although Husserl followed this in principle, he did not see the
systematic connections that Stein here makes with the clarity she did. He, for
example, does not think the person is the subject of motivation in the same way
the I is the subject of constitution. Nor does he see the difference between the
spiritual and natural components of the human person with the same clarity as Stein
does. This is going to be the issue between them, when Stein edits Ideas II and III.
On the background of the clarity gained in On the Problem of Empathy, Ideas II
would appear to Stein as in need of revision in many places for the sake of a clarity
it does not quite achieve.
20She had in other words claimed that we already rely on empathy in order to
identify ourselves as an I, i.e., not as “I,” which requires simply the constitution of
the pole of all primordial experience, but as an I, which knows itself as such, i.e.,
as such a pole (of which, by the very fact that it can be conceptualized by a
universal term, there can be several). There can only be an instance of something
if there can be more instances. Otherwise there would be no instance in the first
place, and no need to use the indefinite article. See On the Problem of Empathy III,
1, p. 38; ESGA 5, p. 41). 
21Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, I, III, §1, p. 39; ESGA 6, p. 35;
tion on empathy, the act in which foreign experience is experienced,
and in which intersubjective experience as a consequence is
anchored.18 In this dissertation she explored the way in which
empathy allows us to constitute not only the world but also ourselves
as objective for others, as it allows us to constitute the I as different
from other I’s, and as experienced by these. This I is incarnated in a
body, which is like that of others’, and which we learn to identify in
a process involving the other, and the body of the other, as schema
or mirror. The I is also experiencing itself as a person, i.e., as
motivated by a value-world spiritually accessible to all persons, and
from these I also learn about this world of values.19 Stein had thus
contended that empathy is crucial for understanding the constitution
of ourselves not only as psycho-physical individuals but also as
human persons.20 
Stein did not, in contrast with Husserl, understand “consti-
tution,” the function or activity of the I in which it manifests itself,
to be experienced by us as unmotivated.21 That is, the full constitu
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Niemeyer, p. 34. The term “constitution” is central to phenomenology and means
as much as “identification.” “Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection
that acts get into with one another: (...) an emerging of the one out of the other,
a self-fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the basis of the other for the sake of
the other” (Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, p. 41). Whether one could
call motivation a “function” parallel to the function of constitution is a question on
which more work ought to be done, as indeed in general on the concept of
motivation in Stein and its ramifications into empathy and the objective and
subjective spiritual worlds. Motivation can be followed, and therefore it is the sign
of the specifically spiritual: Stein calls it the law of the spiritual world in the same
sense causality is the law of the natural world. In nature there is nothing to be
infelt, nothing one can follow: causality has no “inside” what one understands
when one realizes it is external and is factual. When one understands a logical
connection or a spiritual Zusammenhang one understands inner connections, which
often are not “visible” in the physical world. In Personal Connections, Sawicki
designates motivation as “the valence or inclination of the current of experience to
flow forward from one active experience into the next. (...) Motivation is optional,
causation is necessary. (...) It feels different to follow a causal connection than a
motivational connection. We cannot feel-into a causal connection. It is opaque to
the ego. We know it from outside. By contrast, a motivational connection is in-
feel-able. The passage from act to motivated act is something that I can let myself
vicariously ride through. It registers inwardly with me. That means, the way in
which a motivated coherence appears to me exhibits, as a primal feature, its quality
of having originated in another’s choice. Choices let me in: I re-live them, I
understand them empathically. Causes, I can only stand outside of and observe”
(www.library.nd.edu/colldev/subject_home_pages/catholic/personal_
connections.shtmlit, accessed 14 December 2011).
22We see the object as one because we are motivated by the value of its oneness.
23On the Problem of Empathy, IV, 1–2.
24Edmund Husserl: Ideen II, § 49, p. 184, l. 5ff. Ideas II (Studies in the
Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Rojcevicz and Schuwer [Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1989]) makes the distinction between a naturalistic and a personalistic attitude,
which accounts for the differences experienced in seeing the person and seeing
tion of an object as such is motivated in the sense that its unity or
essence provides the reason for its constitution.22 As it is the
experience of motivation that allows us to constitute the person, and
the I as a person insofar as it is motivated in its constitution, we
constitute I’s as persons when we experience them as free.23 To the
extent that Husserl sees the person as part of the empirical I (distinct
from the transcendental I), in Stein’s view he is dividing the
transcendental sphere, leaving the unmotivated activity of the I as
the only sphere of phenomenological investigation. As a result the
sphere becomes incomprehensible.24 Stein thus understood Husserl’s
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things. Both of these are again distinct from the phenomenological attitude. Stein
distinguishes only between the natural and the phenomenological attitude, and
understands the person to be constituted from its involvement with the lawfulness
of the spiritual world, motivation. To her it is empathy that allows us to identify
other subjects of experience, some of which are also subjects of motivation
(persons). There is thus no need for a personalistic attitude, or, as we can also say,
the natural attitude involving empathy is the personalistic attitude.
25This would imply the practical compatibility of transcendental and realist
phenomenology, in the same way as Stein maintains the practical compatibility of
realism and idealism in Introduction to Philosophy (see below).
26He did that only much later in the Cartesian Meditations.
project of reducing experience to the sphere of the transcendental I
to be impossible, and thought instead that the ultimate “ground” is
experience. It is this experience that is transcendentalized by the
reduction, and it is not reduced to the transcendental I, as experi-
ence teaches me in fact (and in principle insofar as objectivity is
experienced) of several, indeed many, I’s, only one of which is
mine. One could therefore contend that Stein was a realist
phenomenologist not because she took the side of Reinach against
Husserl, but because she stayed faithful to Husserl’s project, to
which Reinach also was committed, and which attempts to reduce
experience in order to investigate it exactly as it is experienced.25
This experience includes the experience of the other as experi-
enced by the I, the complex experience of constitution being
motivated, and also the complex web of intersubjective constitu-
tion, which results from this overlay of diversely motivated
perspectives. 
Intersubjectivity
As Stein continued her work for Husserl, she realized that
Husserl did not fully grasp or acknowledge the far-reaching conse-
quences of her criticism for the constitution of the world in its social
dimensions and thus for the foundations of psychology and the
humanities. He did not, despite Stein’s requests, further develop the
understanding of empathy and the constitutional issues relating to it
in his analysis of the constitution of nature and spirit (and between
them the human body and soul) in Ideas II and III.26 As Stein edited
the manuscripts and attempted to make Husserl help her rewrite his
    Why Do We Need the Philosophy of Edith Stein?     695
27Marianne Sawicki (Body Text and Science) and Mariele Wulf (introduction to
ESGA 8) have both provided analyses of Ideas II suggesting that the contentious
issue was the status of the body.
28It involves the constitution of the body as well as the psyche, the soul, and the
mind from experience, but experience enriched by the experience of the other by
means of empathy. It makes me identify (constitute) my own structure as one of
a kind, when I have someone in front of me, whose structure appears similar and
makes me wonder whether in fact I could also be what I see him to be.
29Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften,
literally “Contributions Toward the Philosophical Foundation of Psychology and
the Humanities.”
30Marianne Sawicki has translated Psyche as “the sentient” and Geist as “the
own passages to bring his work into publishable form, she found
body and soul uneasily “thrown in” between nature, constituted by
the natural attitude, and spirit, constituted by the personal attitude,
without a satisfactory explanation as to how the domains and the
attitudes interrelated in the constitution of the human being.27 This,
to her, was disappointing, all the more so because she thought she
had accomplished the needed clarification in outline in her doctoral
dissertation.28 Seeing Husserl struggle with issues she thought she had
resolved, without his being willing to revisit her contribution, made
her accept several detours. Meanwhile she therefore edited the
Lectures on Time Consciousness, subsequently published by Heidegger,
and wrote and edited several of Husserl’s articles. Yet, unable to
convince herself any longer that Husserl was prepared to rewrite and
finish his great project of founding the sciences, she finally resigned
from her post, much to Husserl’s surprise. As she could not reconcile
herself with the idea that the project would never get beyond the
hurdle it had met with Husserl’s incomprehension, she set out to
contribute toward its accomplishment by herself writing Philosophy
of Psychology and the Humanities. This work was intended as a
habilitation thesis, but she did not get sufficient support to break
through the legal status quo as regards women’s access to university
careers in order to succeed. 
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities,29 with its two
treatises: Sentient Causality and Individual and Community consists of
constitutional analyses of the psyche on the one hand and of the
spirit on the other, distinguishing the psyche from the spirit and
nature in the first treatise, and understanding the spirit in its
mediation between individual and community in the second.30 The
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mental.” We find it easier to revert to more literal translations, although the
connotations of these may make them sound a little quaint. Sawicki has also
suggested that Husserl did not publish Ideas II, because he found Stein’s Beiträge
(which he himself published in the Jahrbuch) more convincing, thus rendering his
account of the constitution of psyche and spirit redundant.
31A comparison with Alfred Schutz’ The Phenomenology of the Social World
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967) (Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen
Welt [Vienna: Springer, 1932]) could yield very interesting results.
32For further exploration of the issues addressed in this work see my “Study-
guide to Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities” in Yearbook of the
Irish Philosophical Society, 2004, pp. 40–76; Sawicki’s work cited above; and, for the
background to Stein’s political and social thought, MacIntyre’s Edith Stein. A
Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922. See also B. Beckmann-Zöller and H.-B. Gerl-
Falkovitz (eds.), Die unbekannte Edith Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie
(Peter Lang, 2006) and Wolfgang Riess: Der Weg vom Ich zum Anderen. Die
philosophische Begründung einer Theorie von Individuum, Gemeinschaft und Staat bei Edith
Stein (Dresden: Thelem, 2010).
constitution of the psyche and the spirit is the key to the founding
of the sciences of psychology and the humanities, as the first has the
psyche for its object and the second the spirit. Both formal objects,
the psyche and the spirit, being particularly dependent for their
proper identification on the act of empathy, were specifically
vulnerable to this act not being properly understood. This is why
Stein’s contribution to the foundational enterprise of phenomenol-
ogy focused on the constitution of precisely these objects. She must
have hoped that this contribution would allow for phenomenology
to ground itself sufficiently in an understanding of the structure of
intersubjectivity so as to be able to develop and be of use in the
social sciences, by accounting for phenomena that later were to be
identified as socially constructed.31
The contribution she made through Ideas II provided
inspiration for people interested in the relationship with the other
as well as in the intersubjective basis of phenomenology. If we
read Stein’s treatises in the Husserlian tradition as providing a
systematic account of some of the issues dealt with in Ideas II, they
allow for a phenomenological analysis of valuation, community
and personality in the context provided by others.32 This makes
the treatises foundational for a phenomenological ethics and
politics.
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33We already mentioned Pfänder’s influence on Ricoeur’s philosophy. An
important study could be accomplished by comparing the influence of Pfänder on
Stein and Ricoeur, and evaluating its impact for their respective accounts of
understanding. 
34On the Problem of Empathy IV, 2.
35Peter Freienstein: Sinn verstehen (Turnshare, 2007) is remarkable in presenting
Stein’s work Endliches und ewiges Sein as a development of this theme, in a direction
he designates as imagistischer Philosophie. In his estimation, Stein claims that not only
experience and the experienced have the character of being an image, or being in
the image (of the ultimate, of God), but also the possibility of experience expresses
the ultimate and can only be understood as such. That Stein read the world,
herself, and others as expression and thus as meaningful in this way is very plausible.
That it is the fundamental structure of all her thought is a very powerful idea that
merits consideration. 
36An Investigation concerning the State, II, introduction, p. 147. ESGA 7, p. 107.
37Sartre would have said: “as part of our ‘project.’”
Hermeneutics
As Stein positioned herself as a phenomenologist, she
thought it important to include in her readings not only the Munich
phenomenologists, such as Brentano, Pfänder, and Scheler, but also
hermeneutical thinkers like Dilthey.33 This made her development
somewhat parallel to that of Heidegger, and gives her philosophy a
characteristic “existential” aspect. It is an aspect, rather than an
element, as Stein understood motivation to be an aspect of constitu-
tion, not a replacement of it, and not superseding it, but explaining
it as what makes constitution “free” and spiritual.34 As Stein
understands experience as such to be motivated, it is analyzable as
constituted also by means of interpretation of the motivation present
in it. Experience is expressing the one experiencing, the what experi-
enced, and the possibility of experience as such.35 In this way her version
of phenomenology includes hermeneutics, as it includes a phenom-
enology of values, and does not regard the constitutional analysis of
anything to be finished unless it also includes the constitution of its
value.36 We in fact experience the world as motivating us, and in
doing so we interpret it.37 Even when we constitute a cup, a spot, or
a cloud, we are motivated to do so, as there is otherwise no way of
explaining why we pay attention to these things. Our ways of seeing
things thus speak to others and to ourselves about what we value and
who we are.
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38As Stein struggled with the issues found in Ideas II and III, she wrote “The
Ontic Structure of the Human Person,” which attempts to meet Husserl’s
expectations that the empirical subject includes the person, something which she
had already, in principle at least, rejected in her dissertation. This explains why both
Wulf and Freienstein regard the person as forming part of the empirical I according
to Stein. They have this from an inexact interpretation of the unpublished Ontische
Struktur, which finds its way into her Breslauer lectures Einführung in die Philosophie.
They both miss the distinction already present in the dissertation, and carried
through in the Beiträge, which gives a definition of the person as value-valent and
the I as defined by the function of constitution, which functions in and through the
person as well, insofar as constitution is motivated.
39On the Problem of Empathy IV, 9.
40Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanites, II, I, §1: “A community-subject, as
analog of the pure ego, does not exist.” Here Stein disagrees with Scheler, who did
regard collective persons as real in the same way as individual persons. Max Scheler:
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973) (Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
[Bern: Francke Verlag, 1966]), (II, 6/ B., 4 ad 4) pp. 520–22: “We must designate
as collective persons the various centers of experiencing in this endless totality of
living with one another, insofar as these centers fully correspond to the definitions
of the person which we gave earlier . . . . The collective person . . .  is . . . an
experienced reality.” According to Stein collective persons do not have the original
unity of the I required to provide the unity of the person, although the subjectivity
of collective experience certainly is identifiable as such. (Philosophy of Psychology and
the Humanities, II, II, §4,d [dd]). Stein thus in no way identifies person and human
being, although she does regard the human being to constitute itself as a person
among human persons. She does not, like Scheler (“Hence an individual and a
collective person ‘belong’ to every finite person” [op. cit.]), consider the person to
be essentially related to a collective person, although she does think the person is
dependent for its identification on the identification of other persons, and also
considers the person’s experience as possible to empathize and therefore able in
principle to enter into collective experience. Antonio Calcagno (The Philosophy of
Edith Stein [Duquesne University Press, 2007]) seems to think that Stein, perhaps
more like Scheler, considers the person “a multiplicity of persons” (pp. 125–28),
something logically impossible (insofar as it is not possible for “one” to be “a
multiplicity” without rendering both terms meaningless). It nevertheless reflects the
idea, common to Scheler and Stein, that the person by its essence as subject of
motivation, founded on the logical unity of the I, is capable of participating in
Not all experience is spiritual (motivated by values),
however, as not all I’s are spiritual or are persons.38 That is, not all I’s
access motivation freely; some are driven by instinct only. Nor are
all persons necessarily psycho-physical.39 Persons have a center
constituted by the I, and this is why collective persons are persons
only in a metaphorical sense.40 Persons are essentially value-related:
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experience that is shared by other persons and thus in its essence is capable of
forming community. Persons intercept motivation and can follow it and understand
it (Einführung in die Philosophie, II, b, $, 2).
41Persons can also act on motivation, and the manner in which they do so as
psycho-physical individuals leaves a mark in their temporal being which we read
as their character, shining through their emotional response to things. The
character in turn is supported by a temperament constituted by the facilities for
emotional response characteristic of a psyche (ibid.).
42Thus a solipsist tends to disregard this experience, also because it introduces me
to an experience I can share with others and of which I am not the master. The
sense of threat, of course, amounts to a motivation that can be understood, and
Stein quite likely did understand that the I can feel so overwhelmed by foreign
experience and by motivating powers outside itself, that it may want to shut itself
off from both in order to concentrate on its own experience, validating it by
disregarding the experience of others.
they are “powered” by the sources, which we identify as values, and
they live from these; they are their relationship with them. The
personality reflects the worldview of the I, i.e., its (access to) values,
and our understanding of this personality in turn expresses our
worldview, our personality, our (access to) values, our interpretation
of the world.41 Hermeneutics, the discipline of interpretation,
interprets the motivations of persons, whether as manifested in
productions of the spirit or in worldviews revealed by actions. For
Stein, therefore, this discipline cannot be separated from a phenom-
enology that does not reduce personal experience.
Husserl had found it difficult to see constitution as moti-
vated, quite likely because he thought the unity of the transcenden-
tal viewpoint threatened by it. Motivation, in fact, appears to us
as coming from the outside, precisely because it energizes us from
sources that do not appear to pertain to ourselves.42 Stein draws
from the theory of Scheler to attempt to access the meaning of the
world, as variously constituted by many subjects motivated in
different ways. The world includes the pattern that motivatedness
leaves behind as an intelligible structure, and which we identify
and can analyze as the social construction of world. In this way
Stein goes beyond Husserl by means of insights gleaned from
Reinach, Scheler, and Dilthey, but she does so in a direction
indicated by Husserl’s great vision, and in an attempt to remain
faithful to it.
700     Mette Lebech
43“Ontic,” for Stein, refers to the world as judged to be from within the natural
attitude. Thus Einführung in die Philosophie and An Investigation concerning the State are
analyzing the ontic structure of nature, spirit, and the state respectively. “Ontic”
does not mean naïve in the sense of primitive: we can make highly reflected ontic
analyses, based on constitutional analyses, as indeed are Stein’s analyses. 
44Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, II, II, §4, a–d. See also Marianne
Sawicki’s foreword to the work, and her “Personal Connections.”
45This means of communication is also used when we ride a horse: the horse
responds to our state of mind, our decisiveness, our intention. Unlike the horse,
however, we can consciously work at our state of mind and take it in hand by the
extraordinary resource, which we alone possess: the will. That the mass is formed
by sentient contagion and thus has no inner structure accounts for Rosa
Luxemburg’s understanding of the mass: “The mass is constantly that which it must
be according to the circumstances of the time, and it is constantly on the verge of
becoming something totally different than what it appears to be” (Letter, 16
February 1917, from the Wronke captivity to Mathilde Wurm, GB 5, p. 176, my
translation). Luxemburg’s appeal to the concept of “mass” illustrates its importance
in contemporary political thinking.
The structure of the human being
The structure of intersubjectivity reflects, unsurprisingly, the
ontic structure of human beings in the world.43 Stein sees this
structure as fourfold.44 
(1) The fact that we have a similar experiential structure (a
body endowed with the same type of sense organs allowing for
specifically structured experiential access to what exists) allows for
intersubjective constitution in the first place. We can communicate
(and thus co-constitute) with beings of different experiential
structure to the point where analogy obtains: we can understand, and
by technology translate, the insect’s ability to see infrared light and
we appreciate and make use of the dog’s extraordinary sense of smell
(for hunting down prey or detecting illegal substances, for example).
Because we have specific means of experiencing, i.e., fields of
experience, in common, we can interact accordingly.
(2) The fact that we are sensitive or have a psyche allows for
us to form herd-like structures, like animals (to communicate, in
other words, by lateral transferral of life-power) and to feel pleasure
and pain.45 
(3) That we are free to direct our attention and decide means
we can enter into agreements and other associational arrangements.
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46Christof Betschart: “Was ist Lebenskraft? Edith Steins erkenntnistheoretische
Prämissen in ‘Psychische Kausalität’ Teil I,” Edith Stein Jahrbuch (2009): 154–84.
47The values also may not be completely transparent to experience, as they are
experienced as sources of energy (whether positive or negative), but they can be
investigated in themselves for what they are, for their meaning beyond my
interception of them, which in turn is conditioned by my psychological state.
48They react to fear, evil intention, self assurance, kindness, and approachability,
among other things.
(4) That we, finally, are value-valent as persons makes us
capable of entering into community, which can form the basis for a
common life initiated by the motivational energy freely accessed in
its objects; the sources of the motivational power experienced, the
values. 
Motivational energy is not the only type of energy that
contributes to the energy-economy of the human being. Motiva-
tional energy flows into the general stream experienced, and here it
is experienced only in its mixture with psychic and physical energy
as life-power.46 Life-power (or the lack of it) makes itself felt in
experiences of tiredness, nervousness, and excitement, which seem
to condition our ability to access motivation. This experienced
conditioning is experienced as transcendent, i.e., as something
influencing experience without being completely transparent to it.47
Stein identifies this conditioning factor as “psychic causality”:
distinct from physical causality because it is experienced in our
experiencing, but nevertheless causality as it is opaque and unrespon-
sive to the life of the mind itself: motivation. We seem, in the
context of daily experience, less able to lead a very engaging
conversation when we are tired, for example, or it “costs us more
energy,” which means that afterwards we feel entirely exhausted. To
access the motivating power of the values, a certain amount of life
power seems required: like a car dependent on its battery for starting,
we seem dependent on maintaining a certain reserve of life-power
to get “the motor” of spiritual energy “going.” Life power, because
it enlivens the entire network of the psyche (which is constituted
from all the phenomena manifesting the influence of life power)
allows in turn for spiritual energy to energize the individual and for
the individual to feel motivation. Life power also carries the
motivational energy out into the expression of feelings that blend
into the personal radiance, to which animals also react.48 This means
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49See my On the Problem of Human Dignity (Würzburg: Königshausen und
Neumann, 2009), 252ff. and 279ff., concerning Stein’s understanding of the
epistemological tool of the “type.”
that spiritual energy can be accessed not only from the objective
values as such, but also vicariously through the other person’s psyche
and radiance, as when I take on someone else’s enthusiasm for
something, become depressed in the company of someone who is
depressed, or catch someone’s enmity and return it before I am
aware of it.
Intersubjective constitution also marks what we can call
solidarity, which for Stein can stem from four sources and often
stems from several of these: It can arise from physical experiential
similarity (1); it can arise from the psyche, which allows us to “pick
up” feelings and ideas through “psychic contagion” (2); it can arise
from the will, which allows us to decide to enter an association or
join a cause (3); and finally it can arise from our value response and
involve our very personalities when we are motivated by the same
thing (4).
The social construction of the world, or to put it in Stein’s
terms, its intersubjective constitution, is dependent on the various
ways in which we can share experience. This in turn depends on
how we are ourselves constituted as psycho-physical persons, i.e.,
how we constitute ourselves. This constitution of ourselves is not
arbitrary: it arises from experience as we experience it, but it is
motivated, and in this way we are involved in how we identify
ourselves and the world in which we live.
The social reality we experience as a result of our co-
constitution of intersubjective constitution takes different forms
according to our constitution of the “we,” which we each take to be
ours. How I perceive the world, in other words, depends on how I
constitute the “we” I take to be determining for the intersubjective
constitution of the world. I can constitute this “we” in four
specifically different ways in accordance with the way in which
motivation is transmitted to connect the individuals and power their
shared experience. 
(1) I can say “we” of all those whose experiential structure
is like mine, i.e. all those who are the same kind of being as myself.
Here the “we” depends on the “type” I identify myself with.49
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50When in complete consciousness I choose to do this, I leave my soul behind,
hence the expression “losing one’s soul.”
(2) I can say “we” of a group to which I belong because we
share life power by means of sentient contagion. For example, at a
football match I can be affected by the energy of the crowd without
being internally affected by the objective motivating powers (the
values) originating the motivational energy laterally transmitted to
me by means of others’ psyches. I can grow excited, as a baby might
cry at hearing another baby cry. We can enter into such connections,
as can animals, because we are sentient beings with a psyche. The
psyche is not per se individual, and like a computer network can be
plugged into another to form a functional unity. Thus, by switching
off the substantial principle of individuality in the person (i.e., the
soul), and letting common inclinations take the place of personal
valuation and choice, a submerging of the person in the mass
becomes possible, thus allowing the energy of the mass to flow
freely, but by the same token disallowing the soul of the individual
person to express itself from its depths, perhaps even at all.50 
(3) A “we” can also be instituted by an act of will. This is in
sharp contrast with the previous ways of being together, as will is a
characteristic precisely of the individual and presupposes the original
unity of the I. The motivational energy that binds the group
together is thus not transmitted laterally through a network of
psyches that knows no borders (like interconnected computers); it is
transmitted by specific acceptance, whether or not this acceptance is
in accord with my deepest motivations. I can say “we” because of a
choice I have made to belong to a group or organization of which
I have become a member by some procedure involving choice (it
may also be others’ choice on my behalf). This associates me with
the values for which my organization stands, with its “cause” and the
organization retains the “right” to disengage me from itself if I do
not conform to it. This, however, does not mean that I am in fact
motivated by the values of the organization. The association, Stein
says, regards the individual as an object and deals with it accordingly:
objective qualities of the individual allow it to be a member of this
or that group and permit its procedural involvement with the
organization and its official subscription to the values, by which the
organization retains some power over the expressed value response
of the person who is a member.
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51Today Wroc»aw in Poland.
52Among the students was the later well-known social anthropologist Norbert
Elias. See “Letter to Fritz Kaufmann,” 30 April 1920: Selbstbildnis in Briefen I, ESGA
2, no. 31, p. 57; Self-Portrait in Letters 1916–1942, no. 35.
(4) Finally I can say “we” because I share directly the
motivational energy stemming from the values with others who are
motivated by the same values. This sharing is an objective sharing of
the motivational power intrinsic to the value, and it forms a
commonality far stronger and simpler than the others. It involves not
only the will and the psyche; it involves the whole person, no longer
hostage to either will or psyche, but spontaneously expressing itself,
the soul, in choices and psycho-somatic expression. Community is
thus the only form of commonality that allows the human being to
be fully involved with all that it is, as both will and psyche can
follow on from the personal response without amputation or
instrumentalization. Here, then, the soul can find expression. 
Community is not, however, the only form of commonality
that determines the structure of the intersubjective world. The world
as “hard reality” involves a good deal of structuration initiated
through the other forms of commonality, and thus institutions, pacts,
associations, trends, fashions, and mass movements shape the social
reality of our world, in ways that often provide very little room for
personal expression and sometimes threaten the survival of the
individual and/or his soul. 
Private lectures
While trying to obtain access to academic posts, Stein taught
privately in her family home in Breslau.51 She gave a series of
lectures now published as Introduction to Philosophy.52 The lectures can
be read with benefit as an introduction to phenomenology, since Stein
understands phenomenology to be central to the enterprise of
philosophy as such. Having discussed the privileged relationship
phenomenology has with philosophy, she proceeds according to the
phenomenological method to the constitution and analysis of the
two main regions of material ontology, nature and spirit, with the
foundation of the respective sciences issuing from these. The work
unsurprisingly reflects the structure and idea of Husserl’s Ideas II and
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53Bearing in mind that the work, although obviously prepared for publication,
was not published in Stein’s lifetime.
54Stein was working on Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities at the same
time as Introduction, and a manuscript known as The Ontic Structure of the Person, as
suggested by Wulf (Introduction to ESGA 8). The three endeavors are
systematically linked in that Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities concerns the
constitutional issues relating specifically to the psyche and the spirit, Introduction sets
forth the ontic description of the regions of nature and spirit with their intersection
in the body and psyche, and The Ontic Structure, as its title suggests, is concerned
with the description of the fully constituted person. These dimensions were to
characterize Stein’s work in its entirety: the ultimate reliance on experience, the
corresponding exploration of formal and material ontology, and the understanding
of the human person as subject and object of experience.
55 ESGA 8, pp. 69–72. According to Stein’s own table of contents: I, c. 5. Stein
admits of an “absolute being” of the schemata (prototypes, ideas, or essences), “But
with the absoluteness of the schemata or categories the question of the
independence of being of what we call the real external world has not yet been
addressed. The schema of the thing is of course not itself a thing, it is rather what
III, and is possibly the most comprehensive statement of Stein’s
understanding of the role and potential of phenomenology.53 Here
we find, in contrast to Husserl’s Ideas, empathy accorded the
significance Stein thought it had to have in the constitution of the
other, the person, the body, the psyche, and the spiritual world.
There is no distinction in attitude to account for the distinction
between the regions (as in Husserl’s distinction between the
naturalistic and the personalistic attitude), but a distinction between
the lawfulness of the natural world, causality, and the lawfulness of the
spiritual world, motivation, accounted for phenomenologically in
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities.54
Apart from Stein’s clear statement of the method of phenom-
enology, the work also clarifies the role she accords to the descrip-
tion of ontic structures, i.e., the description of the what of what is
experienced, abstracted from the constitutional issues (i.e., the
possible analysis of the acts in which it is thus constituted), though
presupposing them. This emphasis on eidetic analysis and description
of the what that is experienced as part of the phenomenological task
later allows Stein to conduct comparative analyses of classical and
medieval metaphysics without compromising her phenomenological
commitment to the description of experience as experienced. The
discussion of idealist and realist stances reveals that she is unwilling
to side with either because experience as such seems to disallow it.55
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makes every real thing a thing, in which each ‘participates’ (to use the Platonic
image of the relationship between the idea and its realization). But it has
everywhere a different filling [Ausfüllung], and the substance [Bestand] of the thing
is never exhausted by that which corresponds to the schema in it. Thus it remains
an open question whether, of the two mutually related domains of
being—consciousness and reality (in our case: nature)—one has the priority of
absolute existence over the other, while each has only its meaning as its correlate”
(my translation, pp. 71–72). Potency and Act and Finite and Eternal Being seem to
maintain this refusal to side with either realism or idealism.
56An Investigation (ESGA 7) I, §1; I, §3d; II, §6. 
57Ibid. I, §3d, p. 120ff. ESGA 7, p. 84ff. Stein speaks of a required recognition
from those concerned by legislation because it pertains to them (the citizens) and
a recognition by other states.
The State
Two of the offshoots of Stein’s specifically intersubjective
phenomenology, anthropology and ontology, were to flourish later
in the twin works The Structure of the Human Person and What is the
Human Being? on the one hand, and in Potency and Act and Finite and
eternal Being on the other. In 1921, as the Germans attempted to
recover after the First World War, Stein had not finished the analysis
of the socially constructed world. She turned toward an eidetic
analysis of the most pervasive social construction: the state.
An Investigation Concerning the State attempts to show what the
state is, and how it relates to other important communities like
family, tribe, nation, religion, and friendships.56 The state constitutes
itself as sovereignty and is constituted in our identification of it. This
sovereignty deploys itself in legislation first and foremost and in the
maintenance of the order thus instituted, whether by means of
adjudication, policing, war, education, or public policy.57 That the
state is legislator means its core function is to originate law. In this
function it cannot be but sovereign, although it can by its own
initiative limit its sovereignty in certain regards (e.g., let the family
educate the children as it sees fit, allow religious practices to
influence morality, leave the market to take care of the economy).
It may well see its own interest in such self-limitation, as the
acknowledgment of the existence of other communities within the
state leaves the subjects better able to accept the burdens of confor-
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58 Ibid. I, §3d) p. 112. “The state within whose sovereign territory that happens
[that private groups take over functions such as judging] remains unaffected as such,
as long as the territory is not penetrated with overwhelming force against the will
of the state, but [the intervention] is instead authorized by the state with the express
or tacit proviso that the state can at any time suspend the law made by the other
autonomous power and issue its own regulations. That is, as long as it is a matter
of a self-limitation of the civil authority that does not signify any limitation of
sovereignty.”
59 Ibid. II, §4 b, p. 172 (ESGA 7, p. 119): “Since the state is to be seen as a
subject of free acts, ethical duties can—apparently—be imposed on the state. Yet
it is clear from the start that the state is not an ethical subject in the same sense as
it is a legal subject. To be a state means to be law’s subject. In the instant when it
ceases to bear the responsibility for the operative legal system, the state ceases to
exist.”
60Ibid. II, §1, p. 149: “the state as such merely leaves the possibility open for the
concrete states once again. Then in principle it is not to be rejected out of hand
that the mental life [geistiges Leben] could develop just as well or better without state
regulation as it does with it. And conceivably there are states that do more to
destroy mental values than to produce them.”
61As Stein shows that the state as such is value-neutral, and by its essence is an
mity otherwise imposed by the state.58 Because the state as such is
mere sovereignty expressing itself in legislation, it is by its essence
neither good nor bad, as both law and order can be as harmful as
they can be beneficial.59
The state in this way becomes a background to the commu-
nication between its citizens and may condition the unfolding of the
human person as this happens in the community shaped by the
organization it gives itself, or is determined by. Education, for
example, is organized in the community, by persons who operate in
the various contexts available, be it that of the family or tribe, that
of the state, or that of a church. Their allegiance to any of these
contexts determines their strength, and the interest they may have in
collaboration. The sovereign state can lay the legal framework for
education in a manner conducive to the full development of the
person and in consideration of the various communities it forms part
of, but it can also for its own purposes (i.e., to remain sovereign)
direct it toward goals that are foreign to the person as such, such as
efficiency, destruction of subjects of other states, production, or
power.60 In all of these ways the human being is taken as a means to
an end set by the state. When the human being is no longer
respected as an end in itself we call the state totalitarian.61
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attempt to maintain sovereignty by legislation, she shows how totalitarianism is
possible. The word, of course, post-dates her work, and is linked to the discussion
of how something like the atrocities of the Third Reich provoking the Second
World War (and Stalin’s regime in Russia) could be avoided in the future. Stein
sees the tendency toward the extension of sovereignty to encompass all domains of
human life, if needed for the preservation of state power, as a tendency inherent in
the essence of the state as such. According to Stein this tendency will always
remain. The link between Modernity and the Holocaust, analyzed by Zygmunt
Bauman in a book of the same title, is thus accounted for insofar as modernity is
characterized precisely by the emergence of the state.
62An Investigation concerning the State, I, §2 e, p. 66ff. Whether the state is good or
bad for those with whom it comes into contact depends on the allegiance to values
of those who represent it, and thus to the value of the individuals pertaining to it.
63Ibid. I, §3, g, p. 138: “If the state (…) makes provision that everything will
function within its realm in a way that corresponds to the interests of the
community (...), the state does not immediately assure the preservation of
sovereignty (as with the maintenance of the law), but rather, so to speak, the
material basis for sovereignty, that which in fact makes sovereignty possible.”
Stein sees the state as defined by its activity of legislation, and
essentially determined by the preservation of its own sovereignty.62
Power within the state, therefore (or within any other organization
that has a state-like character, i.e., essentially is sovereignty), consists
in participating in this goal of self-preservation, and involves removal
of factors threatening the state’s integrity. To the state the individual
human being counts insofar as he or she participates in its life, i.e.,
first and foremost as its representative, but also as citizen, producer,
investor, source of know-how or other skills of use to secure the
material and organizational base of the state.63 Moral concern is as
such foreign to the state insofar as it is immaterial to its sovereignty,
but it may in fact be useful insofar as the state relies on the spontane-
ous cooperation of its members and on their flourishing. The
community that underlies the state in the modern nation state is, as
the name indicates, the nation, or the people. This reality, which
depends on or is manifest in a certain cultural unity, i.e. a set of
commonly accepted norms, things done and thought, is not directly
initiated by the state: the state cannot invent a people or a culture.
Nor can it invent community, since its unique goal is order, and
since community has no goal outside itself. 
In the years that followed the composition of her work on
the state, Stein experienced the German nation attempting to
organize itself into one state at the expense of certain human beings,
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64An Investigation, II, §1 (p. 149): “conceivably you could have individuals for
whom—from the standpoint of utility—the state would be superfluous. And on
the other hand, you could have states whose institutions do more to destroy life
values than to further them, and that thus are to be designated as harmful.
Therefore a justification [of the state] in principle is not possible in this way.”
65This period includes the translations of Newman’s letters and the Idea of the
University (ESGA 21–22); the translation of Aquinas’ De veritate (ESGA 23–24);
articles on phenomenology and ontology (ESGA 9), the lectures on woman (ESGA
13) and on education (ESGA 16); the habilitation attempt Potency and Act (ESGA 10);
the twin works The Structure of the Human Person and What Is the Human Being?
(ESGA 14–15); and the autobiography Life in a Jewish Family (ESGA 1). 
who were viewed as outside the ethnic group defined as the carrier
of the state. The definition of Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs as non-
Germans (despite their living within the German lands) was an
attempt by the state to consolidate itself as a nation state by the
means of ethnic cleansing. Because this is not prevented by anything
essential to the state Stein does not recognize the state to have any
value per se.64 The value of the state depends on the values it realizes
by means of its officials and members, as these in fact are not only
carriers of the state’s aim of perpetuating itself, but are also persons
capable of value response. Their motivatedness, i.e., the motivated-
ness which the self-perpetuation of the state concretely allows for,
determines the value of this state. The state becomes an expression
of a collective identity, i.e., of a specific type of intersubjective
constitution, and as such it further conditions this constitution and
any interpretations of reality that are made within its gravitational
field of sovereignty. The state’s tendency to sanction meaning that
testifies to other spheres of sovereignty stems from the fact that it
must stay in charge in order to remain what it is. From this stems
also its long term or enlightened interest in incorporating and
making room for as many other worldviews as is feasible, insofar as
this enhances its prospects of stability. 
II. The middle period65
Stein’s understanding of the importance of the value
response in the carriers and representatives of the state no doubt led
her to move on a personal level toward reconsidering what her
own contribution could be as it became clear that the possibilities
of working as a university lecturer in philosophy were slim. It is in
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66See in particular the excellent background analyses of Alasdair MacIntyre: Edith
Stein. A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922 (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
this context that one must look for her motives for requesting
baptism. 
Stein had engaged herself politically earlier, and her reflec-
tions on the state no doubt also grew out of that engagement.66 With
An Investigation concerning the State, Stein had nevertheless seen that
the State was not a “first” reality: it is dependent for its value on the
value response of the people who lead it. Thus it had become clear
to her that this value response, and in particular the accessibility of
the higher values to the people representing the state, were of a
greater importance—and indeed could be a matter of averting the
greatest dangers of the totalitarian state—than the practical engage-
ment in the running of the state. Her desire to be admitted to a
community guided by the highest type of value response, under the
leadership of the Holy Spirit—the spirituality motivated by the
highest values—expressed what she probably saw as the most
constructive contribution she could give to society. She could give
herself as a spiritual antenna in order to channel the best of spirits to
those around her.
Her conversion was very difficult for her mother, who had
been supporting her philosophical career financially. Stein now
sought employment to obtain financial independence and felt the
need to spend time finding her place in the community of believers
in which she now found herself. Her years teaching German and
Latin in the St. Magdalene secondary school in Speyer afforded her
both. Here, at the instigation of Erich Przywara, she translated
Newman’s letters and The Idea of a University, and also Aquinas’ De
veritate. The Thomas “translation,” in contrast with those of New-
man, is a critical commentary, the ambition of which it is to translate
Thomas’ thought into contemporary philosophical idiom in order to
foster not only understanding of Thomas, but also of this idiom
itself. To this end Thomas’ text is restructured, abbreviated, and
provided with succinct and insightful résumés and critical comments,
attempting to penetrate—as always—to the matters under discussion
and not only to what Thomas says. To Stein the most problematic
feature in Aquinas was his appeal to authorities to justify the
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67This mostly clarifies it. See also Potenz und Act, ESGA 10, p. 3.
68ESGA 23, Q.VIII, a. 11.
69ESGA 3, Selbstbildnis in Briefen, no. 344, from Laurentius M. Siemer, 3
November 1934: “But now I must tell you something that might hurt you. You
do not know Thomism. Both your translation as well as your review have
convinced me of this. The principle of individuation as you see it has nothing to
do with the teaching of Saint Thomas. Perhaps even less the teaching on matter
and form, as it is seen by you. I often had to smile, as I read your article. In your
translation it is not very different; one sees nearly at every page, that the entire
system hasn’t been comprehended by you. You draw completely unthomistic
thoughts into thomistic sentences” (my translation). The article in question is
probably a review of a translation of the Summa contra gentiles. From her critics, such
as Siemer, it should be clear that Stein’s translation is an interpretation. To this
critic, the two points on which she considers Aquinas in need of improvement (the
principle of individuation and the relationship between matter and form) already
stand out. Stein’s answer to this letter (345, Self Portrait in Letters 1916–42, CWES
5 no. 184)—disconcerting as it might seem for those awaiting clarification of Stein’s
own position—explains the divergence from her own lack of understanding. This
is not at all insincere, according to her method of thinking through to the things
themselves. Stein was not yet sure that her lack of understanding was due to the
fact that Thomas’ position on these two issues was unintelligible. 
outcome of his argument. This is toned down, so that the argument
provided is allowed to stand on its own.67 
This way of proceeding—successful because of its preci-
sion—highlights the epochal difference between the presuppositions
of classical and modern philosophy. The thoroughness lets Stein
“discover” things obvious to the careful and persistent reader,
which easily evaporates when doctrinal consistency takes prece-
dence. Aquinas, for instance, admits that God and angels could
have knowledge of the individual, which reveals that he thinks that
individuation by matter (by the principle of non-intelligibility) was
of no essential significance for them.68 Thus individuality as such
cannot be unintelligible (and he could not reasonably think it
was), since it is not unintelligible to superior intellects. This is a
doctrine Stein will maintain, but it exposes her to some of her
more “Thomistic” critics, who accuse her of not having under-
stood Thomas properly.69 Stein’s method presupposes, in fact, that
it is possible to bridge these traditions, that translation is possible,
that the enterprise of translating Aquinas into German is not
meaningless.
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70Aufbau der menschlichen Person (The Structure of the Human Person) and Was ist der
Mensch? (What is the Human Being?) (ESGA 14–15). These works have as yet to be
translated into English.
71 ESGA 16 and 13; the latter translated as Essays on Woman, CWES 2.
72“Auseinandersetzung zwischen scholastischer und moderner Philosophie”
It was the problem of translating between traditions, and so
of mediating understanding, which was to focus Stein’s vocation as
a philosopher as she tried to find her way in Christian thought.
Translation reflects the hermeneutical problem in its entirety: the
difficulty of penetrating chosen texts toward an understanding that
can be shared and thus partake of the tradition (in the handing on
of texts, stories, and things) which is ours. The teacher is con-
stantly confronted with this task: for the teacher tradition is not
optional, whether as providing the material to be critiqued, the
context for understanding, or a suggestion for the future of
cultural life. 
Stein’s reflection on her own teaching practice occasioned
many lectures and articles, and was brought to fruition in her twin
work on educational anthropology.70 Among these lectures and
articles we find several specifically concerned with the education of
women, and consequently on women’s nature and place in society.71
As these were lectures written for a large and mixed public, they are
easier to read than Stein’s monographs. Stein thought it regrettable
that the social interest in the vocation of women was not reflected
in an interest in the specific vocation of men. She also thought that
there are no jobs women in principle cannot do, but that the labor
market should accommodate women’s specific needs and talents to
be able to profit from these.
Return to the university 
Stein was supported by many in her vocation as a philoso-
pher. Dom Walzer of Beuron, who functioned as her spiritual
director, in particular desired her participation in public life as a
philosopher, and it was in accordance with his advice that she gave
up her teaching post in Speyer to attempt another habilitation.
Potency and Act is the first monograph that reveals the state of Stein’s
synthesis of scholastic and modern philosophy.72 
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(Letter to Finke 6 January 1931 [ESGA 2, letter 130]). Heinrich Finke, professor
of history in Freiburg, where the habilitation attempt would take place, also
encouraged Stein “not to bury her talent” (ibid).
73A footnote at the beginning of the first chapter refers to G. Manser, who “calls
the doctrine of act and potency the “innermost essence of Thomism” in “Wesen
des Thomismus,” Divus Thomas 38 (1924), p. 10. In both works the concept of
analogia entis plays a paramount role. This reflects the lasting influence of Erich
Przywara on Stein’s thought. She writes about that influence in Finite and Eternal
Being (Author’s Preface, p. xxix): “Although the first version of her book [she is
here probably referring to Potenz und Akt] and the final version of the Analogia Entis
were written about the same time, the author was privileged to look over the
earlier drafts of the Analogia Entis. Moreover, the lively exchange of ideas between
the author and Fr. Przywara in the years from 1925 to 1931 has in all probability
decisively influenced both his and her approach to the identical issue. To the
author this exchange of ideas was an additional powerful stimulus when she
resumed her philosophical research.” A thorough comparison of the two works has
yet to be undertaken.
74Wege der Gotteserkenntnis, ESGA 17. Ways to Know God: the “Symbolic Theology”
of Dionysius the Areopagite and its Objective Presupositions in Knowledge and Faith,
CWES 8, is Stein’s own completion of the collected works of the Areopagite
(extrapolated from the lines of thought inherent in the work as a whole, or which
We know now that Finite and Eternal Being resulted from
Stein’s rewriting of Potency and Act for publication, and thus we are
tempted to read the latter as an earlier version of the former. That is
helpful insofar as it is, according to the subtitle, “studies toward a
philosophy of being” and seeks, like Finite and Eternal Being, to
ascend to the meaning of being. The two works are, however,
profoundly different. The concept of matter present in the first work
has been discarded in the second and consequently cannot serve as
counter pole to pure act to account for order in the universe, nor to
account for the difference between regional (material) and formal
ontology. The latter distinction, phenomenological by its origin, is
the more important one in Potency and Act (as it structures the entire
work), and thus it is misleading to think that the work is simply
Thomist.73 
Potency and Act is an attempt to clarify what potency and act
mean, from within experience, in accordance with Aquinas’ thought
and in accordance with Husserl’s. Already in the translation of De
veritate Stein had found Thomas’ reliance on Pseudo-Dionysius
puzzling, and it is possible that she began her translation of his works
while translating Aquinas.74 Pseudo-Dionysius’ neo-Platonism (as
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Stein thought had to be the lines of thought given the subject matter treated).
75Potenz und Akt, ESGA 10, p. 4 (Vorwort); CWES XI, p 1.
76Ibid, pp. 4–5; CWES, pp. 9–11
present in The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and The Celestial Hierarchy) lends
Aquinas’ understanding of the analogy of being a systematic aspect,
not present to the same extent in either Aristotle’s or Plato’s
thought. Thomas’ system results from the interaction of potency and
act, together building the analogy of being, and it is thus not
surprising that Stein chose these terms as the terms of her
Auseinandersetzung. 
Apart from understanding what those terms mean, Stein is
exploring their role for Thomas’ and Husserl’s understanding of the
whole, of all there is to know, of being. She says herself that her
work issues from an attempt to understand the “method” of Aquinas
(which in her work on the translation of De veritate she found
lacking), to expose the Organon of his fundamental concepts.75 In this
way she is exploring potency and act through their function for the
understanding of everything else, as they in fact play the role of a
kind of method for Aquinas. She finds it necessary to do so because
Thomas doesn’t explore his own method, and because she as a
philosopher must find out whether the reliance on these terms is
justified or not. Her own method is thus an “objective” (sachlichen)
analysis of Thomas’ fundamental concepts, i.e., an investigation of
the realities expressed in the concepts, a penetration toward their
meaning, toward “the things themselves.”76 As potency and act
divide and encompass being in its entirety, penetration toward their
meaning is likewise a way of approaching the whole of being, as
indeed Aquinas did with the help of this distinction, following a well
established tradition. Both—the penetration toward the Organon of
Aquinas’ thought and the approach to being as such—are equally
important for Stein, although the clarification of the function or the
method serves to provide access to being as such, to found a philosophy
of being, as promised in the subtitle. When Stein thus claims, at the
end of the foreword to the work, that the investigation itself must
account for its method, she points, as is characteristic of all her
philosophical activity, toward the things themselves as the ultimate
reason for proceeding toward them, and she at the same time acknowl-
edges that one will accept the method only to the extent that these
same things are likewise the ultimate reason for one’s own pursuit.
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77Ibid., I, § 1.
78Ibid., I, § 2.
79Ibid., p. 16 (I, §2); CWES XI, p. 20.
80Ibid., p. 17 (I, §2); CWES XI, p. 21.
The work begins therefore by an initial exposition of the
concepts of potency and act as they occur in Aquinas’ De potentia.77
Then the phenomenological starting-point is recalled and experi-
ences are sought that could account for the experiential content of
the concepts. These are found in our experience of time: I am now
potentially recalling what happened many years ago, actualizing the
memory, but not to the point of being able to make it be what
happens now.78 Likewise I can imagine something and attempt to
realize it: the very attempt shows the potentiality of my being
toward the future. The being of the I, which the phenomenological
consideration of doubt leaves as the only epistemologically certain
type of being, falls apart in what I am now, what I was, and what I
will be, with only the now being fully actual. This gives me the idea
of pure being—that being which is always fully actual, in which
there is no potentiality—as a counter idea to the I that I am, whose
potentiality I experience in the experience of time. Act and potency
thus correspond to experiential realities framing the experience of
being, the being of the I. In Stein’s phenomenological parlance,
“act” refers to the movement in which the I is engaging now, its
being and living, and “potency” to all that is transcendent in this
experience; everything “retentional” and “protentional” and all
qualities and depths of the experiencing I. 
With the experiential pattern clarified from within the
indubitable being of the I, three spheres of being emerge: “[1] the
immanent sphere, which is immediately and inseparably close to us
and of which we are conscious; [2] a transcendent sphere, which
heralds itself in immanence; and [3] a third sphere radically different
in its being from the immanent sphere as well as from this transcen-
dent sphere,” namely, pure being, pure actuality.79 A threefold way
leads from the immanent to this last, likewise transcendent, sphere:
mystical experience, faith, and logical proceeding.80
In the work we thus encounter being under three forms—
the internal world, the external world, and the beyond of the
world—spirit in persons and ideas, nature in material things, and the
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81Ibid., II.
82Ibid., II, §1, p. 22. 
83Ibid., II, § 4, p. 37; CWES XI, p. 51: “In actu esse [being in act] and in potentia
esse [being in potency] are modes of being, material fufillments of the form of
being, hence as such they need to be elucidated in a material ontology.”
84 Ibid., pp. 51–52: “But at the same time they designate formal differences of
being; namely, ‘in potentia esse’ designates a being that refers to another (actual)
being.”
85Ibid., p. 52. Translation slightly adapted.
absolute in that toward which both of these point for the explanation
of their existence. Both of the latter announce themselves in the
former in virtue of their transcendence, their reality, or material
fullness (Fülle), and all admit of a meaning to potency and act. 
To investigate whether this meaning is purely formal, and
also what this would mean, the first analysis pertains to formal
ontology.81 When absolute, spiritual, and material being are said to
be different forms of being, to be different with regard to their
actualization of being, what is meant is that they are different
“fillings” (Ausfüllungen) of the empty form of being, and this
indicates that a purely formal analysis will not suffice to clarify what
is meant by potency and act, since they reach across, as different
“fillings,” to material ontology.82 The distinction between formal
and material ontology reflects the distinction between form and
content, again reflecting the function of specification of the genus.
Ontological forms—Leerformen—such as “something,” “what,” and
“being,” can be analyzed as empty forms, because as such they are
susceptible to specification. But act and potency are not empty forms
in this manner: act and potency pertain to the content, and are not
susceptible to specification.83 As formal differentiations of being,
potency means “a being referring to an other (actual) being.”84 Thus,
“these modes of being are to be elucidated formally as well as
materially only in connection with the being they correspond to,”
and thus material ontology must be called upon.85 This is why Stein’s
analysis of potency and act must take the form of a presentation of
the analogy of being, of act and potency as bearing on spirit, nature,
and their presupposition in absolute being. A purely formal analysis
is not possible.
Potency and Act sees Stein work with several of her character-
istic ideas: the ontological status of ideal or essential being, knowl-
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86Letter to Ingarten, ESGA 4, letter 163.
87Mette Lebech, “Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Education in The Structure of the
Human Person,” in What Price the University? ed. Thomas Kelly (NUIM, 2006),
163–77.
88Kant also thought that the regulative ideas of reason (immortality of the soul,
the existence of God, and the unity of the world) were noumena, which lay open
for us to affirm only through the moral law of the categorical imperative. 
edge of the individual, in particular of the human individual, the
nature of matter, the core of the person, evolution and life. It also
sees her work with several of her characteristic interlocutors,
Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Husserl, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and
Martin Heidegger. The contrasting of the scholastic and the
phenomenological approach already yields significant results: the
phenomenologically experienced unity of the I reveals Aquinas’
understanding of the immateriality of the soul to be in stark contrast
with the idea that what individuates everything, and thus also the
soul, should be matter. The absolute being of the I, as underlined by
Husserl, makes it impossible to avoid the ontological investigation
(of the being of the I) to which Aquinas’ contributes. 
The habilitation attempt did not succeed in giving Stein
access to an academic position: her ability was granted on grounds of
previous work, but her financial situation prevented her from complet-
ing the project.86 Finally Stein was offered a position at the Marianum
teacher training college in Münster, which she took in 1932, a position
she would hold only until the Nazis came to power in 1933.
Education of the human being
In the year at the Marianum, Stein drew on her practical
engagement for the educational development of the human being to
write a theory of education, which understandably amounts to an
analysis of the structure of the human person: Aufbau der menschlichen
Person.87 This series of lectures was complemented by a theological
approach: Was ist der Mensch?, which comments on the dogmatic
declarations concerning the nature of the human being. This work
explicitly deals with the questions about the destiny and origin of the
human soul, the purpose of human life, and the meaning of death,
which had to be left open for the purely philosophical investigation.88
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89This period includes the finalization of the autobiography, two volumes of
devotional writings (ESGA 19–20), Finite and Eternal Being (ESGA 11–12), the
translation and commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius (ESGA 17), and the final work
Science of the Cross (ESGA 18).
90Stein conducts this inquiry in dialogue with Jean Hering: “Bemerkungen über
It is perhaps important that the latter volume did not emerge out of
lectures, but was written after Stein had been affected by the expected
ban on Jewish professionals. The mood of the volume is contempla-
tive, and lets the dogmatic declarations on the human being shine forth
in the formative influence that Christian teaching has had on the
development of European thought. The method employed here is as
before: through the texts to the things themselves, in this case the
human being seen in the light of faith in Jesus Christ.
The importance of Christian faith and theology for the
completion of philosophical anthropology becomes a key to Stein’s
later work, as she gives up believing that the ultimate philosophical
questions can be settled without recourse to faith. This happens at a
time when she also gives up believing that there is a place for her “in
the world” and responds to a vocation “outside” the world, where
she had long longed to be. She is allowed to enter the Carmel in
Cologne without a dowry and appears to have settled with gratitude
into the hidden life. 
III. The later philosophy89
Sister Teresia Renata, the novice mistress and subprioress at
Mary Queen of Peace, somewhat unexpectedly encouraged Stein to
finish Potency and Act for publication, having a high regard for Stein’s
abilities and for what she must have seen as Stein’s special mission.
As Stein undertook this work, her external circumstances had
changed: she no longer was under an economic obligation to teach
or to pursue a career, time was regularly given over to writing, and
the quiet disengagement from the world left her room to think and
study within the safe, but austere, haven of a religious community.
Compared to Potency and Act, Finite and Eternal Being takes a
different direction already after chapter II, where the consideration
of formal ontology is replaced by a phenomenological analysis of
essence and essentiality.90 This is due to the fact that for Stein, form
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das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und
phänomenologische Forschung IV, p. 495ff.
91The distinction between form and content, empty form and fulfillment or
“filling,” now moves to the forefront to account for the family likenesses of things.
Form and content are distinct through the type of understanding (Anschauung) we
can have of them: the content when contemplated allows the spirit to come to rest
in the ultimate essentialities, the abstracted form refers beyond itself because of its
emptiness and hence does not allow the spirit to rest in the same way. See Endliches
und ewiges Sein (ESGA 11–12) V, § 2, p. 242. This, however, does not cancel the
idea of formal ontology: “Alles seiende ist Fülle in einer Form. Die Formen des
Seienden herauszustellen ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, die Husserl als ‘formale
Ontologie’ bezeichnet hat” (ibid., 243).
along with matter now seems secondary to essence (and with form
and matter the distinction between formal and material ontology91).
Then a long and close discussion of Aristotle follows, stretching over
the 120 pages of chapter IV, with the purpose of determining the
relationship between the Aristotelian concept of essence (to ti en
einai) and the phenomenological one just expanded upon. In the
course of this investigation the concepts of substance and form are
equally discussed to determine their relevance for the
phenomenological concept of essence, and the ideas of matter, mass,
and material (Stoff) are compared, so as to clarify the Aristotelian
concept of matter on the one hand and penetrate toward (the
procedure is well-known by now) an adequate understanding of
concreteness, and of the bearer (hupokeimenon, Träger) of the being
and its essence on the other. It is the discussion of the bearer that
opens up the later discussions of the person in the last chapters. The
discussion of Aristotle’s concepts of essence and substance thus serves
to clarify how Stein thinks that the phenomenological concept of
essence more adequately accounts for our experience, and to
highlight the problems she sees with the Aristotelian one.
Having discussed essence in relation to concreteness, Stein
turns in chapter V toward being as such, i.e., toward the
transcendentals: the being something, one, true, good, and beautiful
of everything. The divisions of being into spirit, nature, and infinite
being reveals all being, transcendent and immanent, as standing in a
potential (or real) relationship with spirit (everything stands in a
relationship with the divine spirit), and hence opens up the possibil-
ity of everything being true and good, i.e., of everything being
known and being appreciated for what it is. Here she also discusses
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92Endliches und ewiges Sein (ESGA 11–12), V,§ 10, p. 254. My translation.
93Ibid., p. 258. My translation.
94Heidegger: Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986), first printed 1926. The
introduction is entitled: “Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein.”
95“The way the author poses questions in this work and some of her attempts to
solve them might suggest that it is a critical response to the philosophy of Martin
Heidegger. In fact, the personal circumstances of her life in recent years have yet
to allow her such an—explicit—concern. She did, however, work through Sein
und Zeit [Being and Time] soon after it was published [1927], and the strong
impression the book made on her may linger in the present work” (Potency and Act,
CWES XI, p. 4 [Author’s Foreword]; ESGA 10, Vorwort, p. 5).
96At the moment available online in my translation, awaiting publication by ICS
Publications.
97Finite and Eternal Being (CWES IX), p. xxxi; ESGA 11–12, Vorwort, p. 7:
“Though the first acquaintance with Heidegger’s great work dates back many
years, certain reminiscences may have found their way into this present study. The
desire, however, to confront these two decidedly different approaches to the
meaning of being [Conrad-Martius’ and Heidegger’s] was not felt until after the
the being of the relationship in which the spirit embraces being.
Knowledge, insofar as it is a relationship to the object, “helps to
build up the what of knowledge and is condition of its reality.”92 It
belongs to all being to be open to be the object of such knowledge:
that is what is meant by characterizing truth as a transcendental.
“Being is (even if its full meaning is not exhausted by this) being
revealed to the spirit.”93
The meaning of being treated in chapter VI relies on this
division internal to being between nature and spirit, which allows
being a meaning, i.e., a “being for,” a “being revealed.” This
meaning amounts to being as such standing in a definite relationship
with a certain type of being, namely spirit, and thus it amounts to a
being of internal relationship, itself intelligible, like being, and
intelligible because it is. 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit also addressed the meaning of
being.94 In the introduction to Potency and Act Stein noted that her
way of asking the question might make the reader consider the work
a critique of Heidegger.95 The appendix to Finite and Eternal Being,
“The Existential Philosophy of Martin Heidegger,”96 gives an
explicit critique of Heidegger, written as a result of comparing the
approaches of Heidegger and Conrad-Martius after the body of Finite
and Eternal Being had been completed.97 With regard to the question
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conclusion of the work. This explains why the section dealing with Heidegger’s
philosophy of existence has been appended.” 
98In Potency and Act the entire Section VI was conducted “in contrast with
Metaphysischen Gespräche by H. Conrad-Martius,’’ according to its title.
99“I know of no better expression for this way of being, which he calls Dasein
and understands to pertain to all human beings, than unredeemed being” (Endliches
und ewiges Sein, ESGA 11–12, Appendix: Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie, p.
480/“Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy,” trans. Mette Lebech, Maynooth
Philosophical Papers 2007, ed. Cyril McDonnell, p. 81 [B, 2]). “It can hardly be
doubted that Heidegger wants to understand Dasein as the human kind of being”
(ibid., p. 463/p. 69 [B, 1]).
100Ibid., p. 472/p. 75 (B, 2): “Finally: could we speak about having grasped the
ontological essence of death as long as one leaves it open whether it is the end of
Dasein or the transition from one mode of being to another? (We must here
understand the word Dasein as Heidegger has used it in the entire previous
investigation, to mean not only the end of earthly existence but the end of human
beings as such). Is this not rather the decisive question concerning the meaning of
death and therefore decisive for the meaning of Dasein? Should it transpire that no
answer to the question is to be gained from the analysis of Dasein, then it would be
shown that the analysis of Dasein is incapable of clarifying the meaning of death and
thus of giving sufficient information concerning the meaning of Dasein.”
101Endliches und ewiges Sein, ESGA 11–12, Chapter II, § 2, p. 42; CWES IX, p.
37: “If, in turning upon itself, the intellect contemplates the simple fact of its own
being, it reads in this fact a threefold question: [1] What is that being of which I am
conscious? [2] What is that I which is conscious of itself? [3] what is that intellectual
about the meaning of being, Finite and Eternal Being situates itself
between these two approaches, with Stein taking a position closer to
Conrad-Martius, but by no means uncritical of it.98 
Stein regards Heidegger as reducing the question concerning
being to the question concerning the unredeemed human being.99
Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as the meaning of being, in
understanding and explanation, and the being of Dasein as care
concentrates the being question in being-to-death, without,
according to Stein, giving a proper account of death, which would
allow us to understand Dasein and thus being in its entirety.100
Although Stein agrees that the human being with its I provides a
privileged point of departure for the investigation, the being that is
met already in the being of the I itself is experienced as a part
transcending the I. The meaning of being thus transcends the I, and
is found equally in the being of the I and in the being that transcends
the I.101 The meaning of being, i.e., being insofar as it can be
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movement in which I am and in which I am conscious of both myself and the
movement itself?” Translation adapted.
102Ibid., VI, § 1, pp. 284–85 (my translation). The corresponding passage is
CWES IX, p. 331.
103Ibid., p. 286: “We mean this total fullness when we speak of ‘being.’ But a
finite spirit is never able to apprehend this fullness in the unity of a fulfilling
intuition. It is the infinite task of a our knowing” (my translation). The
corresponding passage is CWES IX, p. 332.
revealed, may presuppose the spirit, i.e., the possibility of awareness
of being. But being cannot be reduced to a kind of being, and not
this kind of being (Dasein—the human being) either. The question
of being is first, and for there to be a question of the meaning of
being, being has to be, and be that to which there is meaning, even
if this meaning consists in being revealed to the kind of being which
is spirit.
What is common to the meaning of (all finite) being (where
essence and being differ) is that it is:
unfolding of a meaning; essential being is timeless unfolding beyond the
difference between potency and act; real being is unfolding out of an
essential form, from potency to act, in time and space; the being of
thought is unfolding in several senses: the original arising of the
thought structure is temporal like the movement of thought,
through which it is structured. The “finished” structures have,
however, something of the timelessness of the beings according
to which they were structured, and in which they always were
“possible.” On the other hand, the possibility of a new thought
movement is founded in every thought structure, through which
it can be recreated and gain new being in a thinking spirit (...).102
Apart from unfolding, which is just another name for being,
it also is, in accordance with its transcendental characteristics, one,
true, good, beautiful, and something—something with content
(erfülltes). “We mean this complete fullness when we talk of ‘being.’
But a finite spirit cannot comprehend this fullness fully. It is the
infinite task of insight.”103
The contrast between formal and material ontology
—between form and content—is replaced by one of ideal and real
being. The idea of being as a hierarchy or ladder is abandoned, and
being is seen as instead reflecting a circular movement of mutual
implication (that of the Trinity) in spirit, nature, and absolute being.
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104Kreuzeswissenschaft, ESGA 18 II, b, *, p. 133: CWES VI, 13, d, p. 160
(Unfortunately the CWES translation breaks up the list of content which makes the
translation difficult to use in conjunction with the original text.): “Human beings
are called upon to live in their inmost region and to have themselves as much in
hand as is possible only from that center-point; only from there can they rightly
come to terms with the world. Only from there can they find the place in the
world that has been intended for them.” Also see ESGA 18, p. 137/CWES, p. 164:
“an ultimately appropriate decision can be made only at the extreme depth of
The meaning of being is approached as the happening and valuing
of this reflection as experienced. The struggle with the principle of
individuation turns into praise of the meaning of each individual
being, and in particular of the individual human being. Thinking
through act and potency to finite and eternal being has made the
analogy of being unfold like a flower, with leftovers from both the
phenomenological and the scholastic traditions falling away like
husks. This is an attempt to ascend to the meaning of being, as the
subtitle indicates, no longer by penetrating to the meaning of act and
potency (as in Potency and Act), but by penetrating experience to the
meaning of being itself. The rewriting of Potency and Act made Stein
accomplish a shift in presuppositions: as the concepts of form and
matter were replaced, a new phenomenological ontology became
possible. Insofar as hylomorphism is not essential to Thomism, one
can call her ontology Thomistic. More centrally however, it is an
attempt to advance Christian philosophy in the tradition of the
philosophia perennis.
Science of the Cross
Stein’s name in religion was Teresa Benedicta of the Cross,
to signify, no doubt, what she sensed to be the most formative
influences in her life and vocation. To be blessed by suffering is
something even language seems to rebel at: to maintain that there is
a science of it, or indeed that the idea of science itself relies on it
stops the mind in its tracks. It is the idea of the deepening of the
soul, or the soul accessing its own depths, out of which it is ener-
gized by the highest values and completely hidden from surface life,
that allows us to understand that precisely this soul sees reality more
clearly than the one who lives on the surface and is swayed by
power.104 This deepening happens through suffering, as the soul
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soul.”
105Ibid., II, b, "–(, pp. 126–32; here, 127; CWES 13, 2, a, p. 154: “A created
spirit can only ascend to him by transcending itself. However, since he bestows
being on all that has being, and preserves it in being, God is the sustaining ground
of everything. Whatever ascends to him descends at the same time, by that very act,
into its own center or resting place.”
106These references to the interior castle and its rooms refer to Teresa of Avila’s
work of the same name, to which Stein devoted another appendix in Finite and
Eternal Being.
107Ibid., II, b, *, pp. 135–36.
attempts to find deeper sources of power to energize its life depleted
by pain, whether spiritual, psychological, or physical.
The soul may, even without suffering, turn toward the
spiritual ground out of which it grows, the depths which, as God,
are beyond it and yet are where it is most at home with itself.105 It is
more likely to happen, however, as a result of being prevented from
dwelling in the “outer rooms” of the “interior castle,” i.e., as a result
of experiencing a mismatch between what comes from the outside
and the satisfaction I need or expect from it.106 That it is only in the
“seventh chamber” that the soul has itself completely in hand in
freedom and consequently freely can move about in itself and into
the world, is, according to Stein, reconcilable with this being the
state in which the soul freely leaves everything to God, and hence is
entirely passive in letting his love work itself out through it.107 
Thus the Cross, in the shape of the dark night of the soul,
enables the person to see the world as it really is, not as it is for this
or that purpose, but as it is in itself: the communication of the love
that is divine being. Stein’s engagement with science as an ideal here
finds its endpoint in something beyond it, without which it could
not operate as an ideal, but which for that matter no less lies outside
what can be an object of science. The science of the Cross involves
the subject to the point of its own annihilation and abandonment
into the meaning of being. The paradox is that this abandonment
represents a foundation for knowledge.
Autobiography
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108Editor’s Foreword, Life in a Jewish Family, CWES 1.
Stein had wanted to complete her autobiography when she
arrived in Echt, having fled Germany. The final annotations to the
manuscript are dated from the first anniversary of Husserl’s death (27
April 1939).108 It may be that she still considered the possibility of
finishing that work, as the Gestapo collected her for her final
transport ad orientem. Stein’s characteristic manner of simply ending
the work (instead of summarizing and concluding it), is reflected in
the fact that it remains unclear whether either Science of the Cross or
the autobiography is in fact finished. Perhaps the reluctance to
conclude came from the fact that she did not know what was next,
but did know that there were something next, that any conclusion
is but a pause in a continuous process having its telos behind the
curtain of death, perhaps in the mystery of God. That there is no
conclusion gives room for interpretation, and for the possibility that
the conclusion can be hoped for from elsewhere. Probably Stein
hoped and waited for every word in her last works, and had come to
expect that their unfinished state itself was a reflection of the reality
she attempted to convey. The idea of writing oneself out of oneself
by writing an autobiography is in a strange sense the mirror image
of the Science of the Cross: this is what I think I am, it must be given
up to become what it shall be and for me to become who I am. Thus
the disconcerting lack of closure nevertheless leaves us something to
conclude and thus poses the question of what we want to conclude.
Why do we need Stein’s philosophy? 
To answer this question we had to begin by a reflection on
the nature of need. We found we had knowledge of need from three
sources: inner, outer, and objective—from the subjective experience
of need, from the experience of others in need, and from our
understanding of the whole lacking some of its elements.
Stein’s philosophy in fact fills an inner need, in that it allows
us to see that philosophy is not just a competition of worldviews
issuing in a war of words, but that it is possible to discern what is
true in different worldviews (those of classical and modern thought
in particular) by criticizing them by means of one another. Without
such attempts at mediating different worldviews, philosophical
dialogue breaks down and with it our ability to understand the world
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philosophically. Philosophy itself has the need of being able to
contribute something meaningful in order to be itself, and we need
philosophy to be meaningful in order to make sense of life. Stein’s
attempt at mediating between traditions thus contributes toward
safeguarding the meaningfulness of philosophy and toward enabling
us to trust in the meaningfulness of life.
Stein’s philosophy also fills an outer need, in that it enables
us to begin to interpret the complexities of social life as it is rooted
in the different dimensions of the human being. Here the needs of
the other are seen in their social context, which sometimes thema-
tizes and magnifies them and sometimes disregards and deletes them.
We need Stein’s philosophy to clarify to ourselves the manner in
which the social world is constructed and real and to understand the
way in which we participate in this construction and reality, so as to
be able to justly assess the needs of others as well as our own. We
need to be able to do this to find a path of freedom in the midst of
social constraints and expectations that are not always rooted in
respect for the integrity of the human being.
Stein’s philosophy finally fills an objective need, in that it
suggests a view of the whole, of the world, of the human being and
of humanity, that can aid us in building a plausible view of the
whole in the light of which we can judge plausibly about need. To
Stein this view includes the contribution of Christian revelation,
which we need insofar as she is right that without it, no view of the
whole can be accomplished with regard to the beginning and end of
the human being, as well as the meaning of the world as a whole. We
thus need Stein’s philosophy to contribute to a contemporary
philosophical anthropology as much as toward a contemporary
ontology.
Stein’s honesty and integrity in her search speak for them-
selves.                                                                                  G
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